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As usual, Professor Robertson has challenged us all. I will limit my comments

to addressing some of his suggestions for improving NWP 9A and its annotations,
and conclude with some observations of my own.
Professor Robertson correcdy notes the conundrum of our topic. While
civilians and civilian objects are normally not legitimate objects of attack - and
we are dealing with civilian merchant ships with civilian crews - many of these
merchant ships contribute in a major way to the prosecution of the war effort
of their country.
It is my sense that there has been a shift in the balance of interests since 1920;
merchant ships were smaller and in greater numbers then; hence a larger number
of civilians were at risk, particularly in an age when search and rescue at sea was
primitive at best. Today's merchant fleets are generally made up of fewer yet
larger ships with smaller crews, ships which are more easily tracked and which
can have on board vasdy better survival equipment (1 refer here to the kind of
equipment kept on off-shore drilling platforms). Certainly the military importance of the cargo carried on board, whether it be revenue-raising exports or
imports of war materiel, is no less than before.
In the land warfare context, we know that noncombatants may not be used
to shield military objectives from enemy attack and that the presence of
noncombatants within or adjacent to a legitimate target does not preclude its
attack. Indeed, a party to the conflict has an affirmative duty to remove
noncombatants (over which he has control) from the vicinity of targets of likely
enemy attack. (NWP 9A, para. 11.2). We also know that civilian objects become
legitimate military objectives - and thus subject to attack - when, by their
nature, location, purpose or use they effectively contribute to the enemy's
war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and when their total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite military advantage to
the attacker under the circumstances at the time of the attack. (NWP 9A, para.
8.1) Anti-shipping operations are undertaken against that kind of maritime
commerce for the very reasons stated in the rule. So it must be unquestioned
that you can attack merchant shipping - fitting that criteria - since they lose
their protection as civilian objects and the civilians on board must be considered
to have assumed the risks associated with attack, such as becoming shipwrecked.
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I suggest therefore that the protections due civilian crew on board enemy
merchant ships are too rigidly stated in the 1936 Protocol.
Let me now respond to a few of Admiral Robertson's comments.
First, the decision to treat attacks on enemy merchant ships by category of
warfare specialty was driven in part by the audience for whom NWP 9 is
intended: the line officer who has one of three distinct warfare specialties:
surface warfare, aviation, or submarine. We also felt it necessary to take into
account the military differences between their platforms of attack, and the
necessity to accommodate the legitimate need to provide protection to civilians
consistent with the legitimate military objective of sinking enemy merchant
shipping that was supporting the enemy's war effort. We will consider very
carefully Admiral Robertson's suggestions as to the implications - intended or
not - of the differences in the formulation of the rules applicable to surface, air
and submarine warfare.
Second, regarding the effect ofarming a merchant ship on its immunities from
attack, I took the view that, while the crew may view its weapons as "defensive,"
the enemy is not likely to be able to make that distinction ifit sees weapons on
board that can cause it harm. Light individual weapons such as the hand gun and
the shotgun - permitted medical personnel and chaplains for self protection
and for protection from marauders (see NWP 9, para. 11.5) - would not in my
view constitute arming the ship, unless of course they were aimed at the
overflying aircraft or submarine. The real concern is necessarily with larger
caliber weapons, including crew-served weapons, and weapons mounted topside
that are intended for non-human targets. If the merchant ship is a legitimate
military target by virtue of its cargo, it certainly may be armed with such
weapons. But if its cargo does not make it a legitimate enemy target, the ship
ought not be armed lest the enemy think otherwise. That is the military reality,
and our formulation of the rule reflects that view.
Third, Admiral Robertson rightly points out that NWP 9 does not identify
what levels ofcommand may determine whether the conditions exist that would
authorize destruction of an enemy merchant ship. He suggests that some may
be best made by the on-scene commander, while others involve policy decisions
best made at higher levels of govemment and "implemented by a service-wide
directive." I agree with the former, but would note that the latter would be
promulgated down the operational chain of command, not the administrative
chain. The existing system for making those decisions, and where I would expect
to find them reflected, is in the rules of engagement promulgated for the
operation or campaign. As is well known to many of you, rules of engagement
are the implementation of the interaction of the relevant factors: the applicable
law, the military/operational considerations, and the policy goals established by
the civilian leadership.

Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping

366

I do believe Admiral Robertson has overstated the effect of the fonnulation
of the rules in paragraph 8.2.2.2 (pp. 347-348). I have already pointed out what
I think are the legitimate exceptions to the anning criterion, and I believe the
principle of proportionality reflected in the stated definition of a military
objective is not nearly so open-ended as "no clear military advantage to the
attacker" as stated by Admiral Robertson. I think there is a reasonable and
realistic balance reflected in Chapter 8.
While Admiral Robertson questions how a submarine might itself signal a
merchant ship to stop, I suggest that integrated operations may see the torpedoes
come from beneath the waves toward the ship which does not stop when radioed
to do so by the P-3 or the frigate, or by the submarine who transmits the order
by satellite relay.
Finally, I take a different view of the modem viability of the Protocol. As a
nation we have not renounced very many treaties - it is very hard to do. But
if the Protocol continues to reflect accepted values, and I believe it.still does,
then we have to apply its concepts to the modem maritime world and cannot
usefully say its a dead letter while refusing to abrogate it or claim desuetude. I
think it is misleading - and mischievous - to suggest that the Protocol exists
but is ignored in practice. It has not lapsed into desuetude, but must be
understood to be not applicable across the board as some would have it. We
cannot afford to have law which is ignored all the time. That leads to disrespect
for the rules. Rather, we need law which will be followed most of the time.
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